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When Tool Names Are Not Identities: Measuring Provider Misbinding in MCP-Based AI Agents

Zeynab Anbiaee, Sajjad Dadkhah, Ali A. Ghorbani · 17 Nov 2026 · arXiv

Abstract

Large language model (LLM) applications increasingly act as agents that select and invoke external tools. The Model Context Protocol (MCP) standardizes this interaction by allowing clients to compose tools advertised by multiple servers. However, tool metadata used for discovery and selection is not, by itself, necessarily bound to a verified provider identity. This paper studies this gap as tool-provider misbinding: a failure in which a request intended for a legitimate provider is instead resolved to an attacker-controlled tool. The attacker does not compromise the host, LLM, legitimate server, or network channel; it only operates another MCP server that advertises tools with chosen metadata. We formulate tool provider misbinding as an attacker-controlled tool-selection optimization problem and evaluate it in a controlled MCP environment across five LLM-based clients. The results show that interactions drive misbinding. The strongest failures occur when exact-name collision, task-aligned description, and compatible schema reinforce one another, but authority-enhanced descriptions with compatible schema can also cause wrong-provider execution or unresolved provider ambiguity witho

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